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Canada needs a tax system that not only lowers the cost of R&D 
through upfront subsidies, but also allows firms to reap the rewards 
of R&D success and innovation.
NO. 334, SEPTEMBER 2011
FISCAL ANDTAX COMPETITIVENESSBusiness innovation is viewed by many as a solution to Canada’s ailing productivity
performance. One of the more troubling aspects of Canada’s innovation track record is that
businesses spend relatively little on research and development (R&D) despite having access to
some of the world’s most generous R&D tax incentives. 
Canada’s low levels of business R&D have called into question the effectiveness of Canada’s
generous R&D tax incentives, particularly the flagship federal Scientific Research and
Experimental Development (SR&ED) program. A deeper analysis, however, reveals that tax
incentives are effective in stimulating more R&D – that is, Canada would have lower levels of
business R&D in the absence of these inducements. Instead, the root cause of Canada’s business
R&D deficit appears to stem from structural aspects of the economy and, more importantly, a
lack of demand-related pressure to pursue innovation.
The rationale for R&D tax incentives rests on the notion that R&D undertaken by individual
firms creates knowledge benefits that “spill over” to the Canadian economy. To determine
whether tax incentives create value for the overall economy, one must establish whether the
additional R&D generated produces large enough spillover benefits to offset the associated costs:
tax administration, compliance and the costs of financing the incentive. 
Weighing the costs and benefits, the available evidence suggests that the SR&ED tax
incentive program has generated a narrow net benefit to Canada. But there are two important
caveats. First, there is a great deal of uncertainty regarding the size of this net benefit, given the
wide range in estimates from the literature, particularly those relating to spillovers. Second, the
observation of a net benefit does not imply that the current SR&ED incentives are optimal, or
that improvements cannot be made. If anything, the sensitivity of the results indicates that 
the SR&ED program is highly susceptible to falling into the “net loss” category in the absence 
of change. 
So what should be done? Tax policy should be focused on creating a balanced and competitive
tax environment across the entire innovation value chain, from initial R&D through
commercialization to the development and production of new products and services. The
current system of tax support is front-end loaded, pushing firms to undertake R&D through
upfront subsidies. At the same time, the rewards generated by R&D and other innovative
activities are taxed at rates above many countries, creating a disincentive to commercialize and
develop new products and services in Canada. Indeed, among OECD countries, Canada offers
the third-most generous subsidies for R&D investment, but is in the middle of the pack in terms
of the overall competitiveness of its business tax regime, after accounting for recent and planned
corporate tax cuts.
This Commentary introduces some federal tax policy considerations to spur innovation. The
federal government should continue to focus its efforts on market “pull” factors by ensuring
taxes on income derived from patents and subsequent production of new products and services
(the fruits of R&D) are kept at internationally competitive levels. The federal tax regime should
also not discourage the growth of small firms into larger, globally competitive companies. 
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E
conomists have good reason to
obsess over Canada’s productivity
performance. As labour supply
becomes more constrained, thanks to
an aging population, Canadian workers
will need to be more productive to
support a higher standard of living for
themselves and their older, retired peers.
Productivity’s critical importance in wealth creation
makes Canada’s performance all the more worrisome.
Between 2000 and 2010, labour productivity –
output per hour worked – grew at a sluggish
average pace of 0.9 percent a year, about half the
growth rate registered by the Group of Seven (G7)
industrialized countries and 40 percent of the US
increase (OECD 2010b).
1 Drummond and
Bentley (2010) call Canada’s lack of productivity
growth “Canada’s #1 Economic Issue Today.” 
Identifying Canada’s productivity problem is
much easier than pinpointing the solution. The
productivity challenge is multi-dimensional, and
there is no magic bullet solution. But at the heart
of the productivity puzzle is innovation. The logic
is simple: if Canadian firms are to be more
productive over time, they must be doing something
better, or more innovatively, than before. 
Canada’s relative lack of innovation is likely one
of the key culprits behind Canada’s productivity
struggles. Measuring the contribution of business
innovation to productivity is challenging, though
a measure called multi-factor productivity (MFP)
provides some help. Growth in MFP measures the
changes in labour productivity that is not accounted
for by growth in physical capital (e.g., machinery
and equipment) or from workforce skills. Much of
MFP is believed to arise from business innovation
– finding better ways to extract value from capital
and labour resources.
2 Some view low MFP growth
as being primarily responsible for Canada’s weak
labour productivity growth since 1980 and see
this as a reflection of weak business innovation
performance (CCA 2009). 
Indeed, the weakness in MFP is pervasive across
nearly all provinces. In a recent Commentary,
Coulombe (2011) found that MFP growth in all
provinces, with the exception of Newfoundland,
was very low between 1985 and 2009 and blames
poor innovation performance, namely the weak
adoption of technologies.
3
International benchmarking studies also point
to relatively low levels of Canadian innovation.
The Conference Board of Canada (2010) reported
that Canada is a below-average performer in its
capacity to innovate, ranking well behind its
developed-country peers on a variety of innovation
measures such as patents, trademarks and high-tech
manufacturing.
This Commentary introduces some federal tax
policy considerations to spur innovation. The
federal government should continue to focus its
efforts on market “pull” factors by ensuring taxes
on income derived from patents and subsequent
production of new products and services (the
fruits of R&D) are kept at internationally
competitive levels. The federal tax regime should
also not discourage the growth of small firms into
larger, globally competitive companies.
Fostering Innovation in Canada – The Role
of Business R&D
One of innovation’s key ingredients is R&D
investment. Canadian business R&D has led to
The author would like to thank Ben Dachis, Alex Laurin, Daniel Schwanen, Finn Poschmann, Joanne Johnson, Nick Pantaleo, James
Milway and Bev Dahlby for insightful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Thanks is also extended to Nicholas Phillips from Finance
Canada, with whom I collaborated on earlier work related to Canada’s R&D tax incentives. They are not responsible for any errors or omissions.
The views expressed in this Commentary are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of PricewaterhouseCoopers
LLP (“PwC”). 
1 For commentary on Canada’s productivity record see, for example, Cooper (2010) and Sharpe (2010).
2 MFP can also arise from errors or omissions in the measurement of workforce skills and the capital stock. 
3 Coulombe argues that his approach minimizes MFP measurement-error problems as, unlike many international studies, he used data from a
common data source and applied the same methodology from all provinces. This implies that the weakness in MFP was coming mainly from
technological or innovation issues rather than measurement problems.| 2 Commentary 334
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breakthroughs in medicine, information
technology, biotechnology and many other fields.
The BlackBerry, one of the world’s leading smart
phones developed by Research In Motion in
Waterloo, Ont., is just one modern example of
Canadian business R&D success.
Empirically, business R&D is strongly linked to
measures of innovation output. The OECD has
shown a strong positive relationship between a
country’s patent levels and its industry expenditures
in R&D (Figure 1). A strong relationship also
exists between business R&D intensity and the
World Economic Forum’s Innovation Index,
which is a much broader measure of innovation
performance (CCA 2009). 
The real test, however, is whether business
R&D ultimately translates into productivity
improvements. Surveying the extensive literature
in the area, the US Congressional Budget Office
(2005) concludes that “results from econometric
studies strongly suggest that R&D spending has a
positive influence on productivity, with a rate of
return that is likely to exceed that on conventional
investments.” An earlier OECD (2003) study
showed that an increase in the business R&D to
GDP ratio of just 0.1 percent is associated with an
increase in real output per capita of 1.2 percent.
In his assessment of the evidence, Macklem (2011),
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Figure 1: Patents and Industry Financed R&D – 2005-07
Note: “Triadic” patent families refer to patents filed at the European Patent Office, the US Patent and Trademark
Office, and the Japan Patent Office, that protect the same invention. According to the OECD, triadic patent families are the most comparable
national patent statistics, removing home advantage and the influence of geographical location.
Source: OECD (2009).Commentary 334 | 3
Essential Policy Intelligence C.D. Howe Institute 
points to spending on R&D and innovation as
key factors that make firms more productive.
4
Despite the importance of business R&D,
Canada simply does not measure up to its peers.
As a share of economic output, Canada’s business
R&D investment comes in well behind the average
for OECD countries, ranking 20
th among 38
developed and developing countries (Figure 2).
Moreover, Canada’s performance has worsened in
recent years, with the R&D to GDP ratio reaching
its lowest point in more than a decade in 2008
(Figure 3). Canada’s languishing business R&D
performance has not gone unnoticed. The federal
government in 2010 struck an Expert Panel to 
re-evaluate how the federal government supports
business and public R&D in Canada.
5
Government Support for Business R&D 
in Canada
There is little doubt that Canadian governments
are committed to supporting R&D. The federal
and provincial governments fund in excess of 
$7 billion a year through R&D grants, more 
than half of which flows to higher-education
institutions.
6 Indeed, Canada’s expenditures on
higher-education R&D as a share of GDP ranks
near the top of OECD countries, even coming
ahead of the US (OECD 2010).
7
Canada’s commitment to R&D, however, is by
no means confined to public sector grants. The
federal and provincial governments also provide
generous tax incentives to encourage business
4 Other firm-level factors identified include investments in machinery and equipment, particularly in information and communications
technology, employing workers with higher education attainment and competing in foreign markets. 
5 On October 14, 2010, the Government of Canada launched the Expert Review Panel of Research and Development to study all federal
programs that support business innovation. Recommendations to the government are expected in October 2011. 
6 Preliminary estimate as of 2010. Source: Statistics Canada CANSIM table 358-0001: Gross Domestic Expenditures on Research and
Development by Funding Sector (Provincial and Federal Government).
7 Higher education expenditures on R&D as a share of GDP were 0.6 percent of GDP in Canada compared to the OECD and US averages of






































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2: Business Expenditures on R&D – 2008 
Source: OECD(2010).
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*European Union (15 Countries)
Source: Statistics Canada, Eurostat.
Figure 3: Business Expenditures on R&D by Year
investments in R&D. By far the largest tax subsidy
is the federal Scientific Research and Experimental
Development (SR&ED) tax credit, which costs in
excess of $3 billion per year.
8 The credit ranges
from 20 percent for larger firms to 35 percent for
small Canadian-controlled private corporations
(CCPC) and applies to a broad range of eligible
R&D spending such as wages, materials, equipment,
R&D contracts and related overhead expenses (see
Box 1). Unused credits can be carried forward for
up to 20 years or back three years to reduce taxes
payable. Another feature that makes SR&ED
especially generous is that it applies to all eligible
expenditures in Canada; in contrast, the US R&D
tax credit applies only to incremental expenditures,
or expenditures above a historic average.
9
All provinces (with the exception of PEI) top
up SR&ED with their own credits, ranging from
10 percent in BC and Alberta to 35 percent
(wages only) in Quebec. As an added incentive,
R&D investments also receive favourable tax
deductibility rules – R&D spending (including
equipment purchases) is fully tax deductible in the
year it is incurred. This means that instead of
amortizing R&D investment over several years, as
with most types of physical investment, Canadian
companies can claim all eligible R&D expenditures
as an expense in the year it occurred to reduce
taxable income. 
Such generous incentives provide Canadian
businesses access to one of the most heavily
subsidized R&D tax regimes in the world. The
overall subsidy rate on R&D in Canada – defined
8 The most recent estimate by the Department of Finance is $3.49 billion in 2008, with projections of $3.28 billion in 2009 and $3.47 billion
in 2010. Source: Finance Canada (2010b).
9 The US R&D tax credit is applied to the excess of qualified research expenditures over a base amount (credit rate and definition of base
amount varies depending on method used). From a policy perspective, the advantage of an incremental tax credit over a volume-based credit
is that it reduces the subsidy on R&D that may have been performed in the absence of government support. The disadvantage, however, is
that an incremental credit is more complicated and expensive to comply with and administer. It can also lead to large fluctuations and less
predictable amount of R&D support. Commentary 334 | 5
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Box 1: The Federal Scientific Research and Experimental Development (SR&ED) Tax Credit
The SR&ED tax credit program reduces taxes payable by an amount of 20 percent to 35 percent of
eligible R&D spending. 
Rates and Thresholds
The general federal SR&ED tax credit rate is 20 percent of eligible R&D performed in Canada. This
rate increases to 35 percent for spending by Canadian-controlled private corporations (CCPCs) up to a
maximum of $3 million in qualified expenditures. The expenditure limit becomes lower as taxable
income and capital rise above certain thresholds. Specifically, the limit is phased out for every dollar of
prior-year taxable income above $500,000 up to $800,000, and for every dollar of prior-year taxable
capital above $10 million to $50 million. For example, a CCPC with eligible R&D expenditures of $5
million and below the taxable income and capital thresholds would receive a 35 percent credit on the
first $3 million of spending and a 20 percent credit on the remaining $2 million. The federal SR&ED
credit is applied to eligible spending net of any provincial investment tax credits.
Refundability
Tax credits earned at the 35 percent rate are fully refundable for current expenditures and 40 percent
refundable for capital expenditures. Tax credits earned at the 20 percent rate are non-refundable, with
the following exceptions: unincorporated businesses and small CCPCs with prior-year taxable income
capital up to the $500,000 and $10 million thresholds, respectively, for qualified expenditures that
exceed the $3 million expenditure limit. Such entities are eligible for 40 percent refundability on eligible
current and capital expenditures. Unused credits can be carried forward up to 20 years or back three years
to reduce taxes payable in those years.
Eligible Activities and Expenditures
To be eligible for the SR&ED program, firms must demonstrate that their activities meet Canada
Revenue Agency criteria. First, the activity must generate information that results in scientific or
technological advancement. Second, the outcome must be unknown in advance of undertaking the
activity. Third, the activity must be carried out by qualified personnel and must involve systematic
investigation through experiment and design. 
Most expenditures associated with these activities in Canada, including salaries and wages, materials,
equipment (if substantially used for R&D) and certain expenses from contract work performed by
eligible organizations (e.g., universities) are eligible for the SR&ED tax credit. In addition, firms can
claim a portion of overhead expenses that are tied to eligible R&D activities. In the 2008 federal
budget, spending eligible for the credit was expanded to include certain salary and wages of Canadian-
resident employees carrying out SR&ED work outside Canada.| 6 Commentary 334
C.D. Howe Institute
10 The subsidy rate is calculated from a straightforward transformation of the Marginal Effective Tax Rate (METR) on R&D investment. The
METR measures the overall tax burden on new investment, factoring in a broad range of tax measures such as investment tax credits,
corporate taxes, capital taxes, sales taxes, depreciation allowances and interest deductibility. More specifically, the METR measures the
fraction of the return on new investment that goes toward paying corporate-level taxes (the “tax wedge”), expressed  as a share of the return to
investors. Because R&D is subsidized in most countries through investment tax credits and generous tax deductibility, the METR on new
R&D is typically negative (i.e., the net of tax return is higher than the gross of tax return). METRs are the most widely accepted measure for
comparing corporate tax regimes, as they capture all tax incentives relevant to firm investment decisions. 
as the percent reduction in the cost of R&D
arising from tax incentives – is about 30 percent
(Finance Canada 2009).
10 This gives Canada the
third-most generous R&D tax regime among 36
countries studied, behind only France (40 percent)
and Spain (35 percent). Other summary measures
of tax support reach the same conclusion. The 
B-Index, or the after-tax cost of R&D due to tax
credits and depreciation allowances, yields roughly
the same rankings of tax assistance across the
comparison group, with Canada again the third-
most generous tax regime.
The overall R&D subsidy rate in Canada masks
some important differences in the treatment of
small versus large firms. As discussed, many small
firms are eligible for a SR&ED credit of 35 percent,
well above the 20 percent for larger corporations.
Moreover, firms that are eligible for the 35 percent
credit benefit from refundability provisions,
meaning that a cash credit is provided even if
taxable income is not generated. Canada’s overall
subsidy rate for small firms is the second most
generous among OECD nations at 46 percent,
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Figure 4: Effective Subsidy Rate* on R&D Investments (percent)
* Percentage reduction in cost of R&D due to tax incentives.
Source: Finance Canada (2009).Commentary 334 | 7
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asymmetric treatment of small and large firms
appears to stem from capital market challenges –
the idea that small, start-up companies typically
lack internal funds and find it more costly to raise
financing than their larger counterparts.
11
Canada’s generosity towards business R&D
holds true even if grant programs are factored into
the international comparisons. The OECD (2010)
looked at the total support that governments
provide businesses to undertake R&D, directly
through grants and indirectly through tax incentives.
Among 30 member-countries studied, the OECD
found that Canadian governments spend the
second highest amount (as a share of GDP) on
business R&D after Korea.
12 Canada’s generosity
stems almost exclusively from R&D tax incentives
– the country spends relatively little, as a share of
GDP, on direct R&D grants to business compared
to the US or the average of OECD countries.
13
Canada’s SR&ED Tax Incentive: 
An Evaluation 
As we have seen, Canada’s sub-par business R&D
spending arises despite the fact that the country
offers one of the world’s most generous R&D tax
regimes. This observation has called into question
the effectiveness of the R&D tax incentives. While
it is tempting at first glance to conclude that
Canada’s R&D subsidies are not working, a deeper
analysis is required. 
First, Canada has witnessed a near doubling in
its business R&D to GDP ratio since the early
1980s (Figure 3). The federal government has
been offering tax credits for R&D activities since
1977, and introduced the present version of the
program (notwithstanding incremental changes)
with refundable credits for CCPCs in 1985. So
while the level of R&D may be low, the growth 
in R&D has been significant since credits were
introduced.
Second, and most important, there are reasons
well beyond tax incentives why business spending
on R&D may be low. R&D spending levels are
dictated by both the demand and supply drivers of
innovation. Tax incentives lower the cost of R&D
and, therefore, impact the supply of R&D. The
demand for R&D, on the other hand, is influenced
primarily by pressures on individual firms to
innovate – corporate cultures, exposure to foreign
competition, characteristics of the industry and
public policies (CCA 2009). Hence, tax incentives
alone are not sufficient to drive high R&D levels.
As the OECD (2011) notes: “Neither the supply-
side nor demand-side policies are likely to be
effective in isolation. Fostering innovation requires
addressing the entire innovation chain.”
Demand forces appear to be weighing on
Canada’s R&D performance. The CCA (2009)
and the Science, Technology and Innovative
Council (STIC 2011) have noted that, relative to
their international peers, Canadian companies
have failed to adopt innovation as a business
strategy. The reasons are not entirely clear, but
some Canadian companies do not seem to feel the
same pressures to innovate as firms in other
countries. A survey of business executives in
Canada found that a “culture of complacency,
rather than a drive to innovate” was cited as the
11 There is some empirical support for this argument. Reviewing the literature, Hall (2002) notes that “there is fairly clear evidence, based on
theory, surveys, and empirical estimation, that small and startup firms in R&D-intensive industries face a higher cost of capital than their
larger competitors and than firms in other industries.” The issues associated with using an enhanced credit to address small firm financing
problems is discussed later in this paper.
12 The OECD data does not capture the tax expenditures associated with sub-national (e.g., state, provincial) R&D tax credits.
13 The principal advantage of tax incentives is that businesses, as opposed to government officials reviewing grant applications, make decisions
about R&D investments, resulting in market-driven innovations. On the other hand, proponents of government grants argue that greater
focus can be placed on R&D projects perceived to offer the highest return to society. Reviewing the literature, Parsons and Phillips (2007)
argue that the appropriate mix between grants and tax incentives depends on a country’s policy priorities, making the comparisons difficult,
and that there is no “evidence-based reason to choose among tax credits, grants and publicly performed R&D.”| 8 Commentary 334
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most important reason why Canadian productivity
lags the US rate.
14
Structural characteristics are also important. For
example, a Finance Canada study (ab Iorwerth
2004) found that Canada, compared to the US,
has a smaller concentration of industries that are
known to have high R&D intensities, such as
pharmaceuticals and telecommunications. But this
only accounts for part of the Canadian R&D
weakness. According to the consultation paper put
forward by the Expert Review Panel on Research
and Development (2010) even after accounting
for differences in the sectoral mix, an even larger
portion of the gap between US and Canadian
R&D business investment stems from the
“pervasive weakness in business R&D intensity
across many sectors in Canada.”
Another structural consideration is that a large
number of foreign-owned multinational
enterprises (MNEs) operate in Canada. While
MNEs do undertake R&D in Canada through
their subsidiaries, much of their R&D is
performed from head-office locations outside of
Canada, particularly in the US (Harris 2005). 
As a result of these factors, there are good
reasons to believe that Canada would have even
lower levels of business R&D investment in the
absence of R&D tax incentives. That is, R&D
levels may be boosted by tax incentives, but
weighed down by the above demand and structural
forces, leading to Canada’s current status as a 
sub-par performer. Later in this paper, I present
evidence that shows this appears to be the case.
However, even if tax incentives spur more R&D,
this does not necessarily prove their worth. It
must also be demonstrated that the additional
R&D creates knowledge “spillovers” to the rest of
the economy that more than offset the cost of
providing the tax credits. 
In the following section, I introduce a framework
to evaluate the SR&ED tax incentives based on
some earlier work I conducted with colleague
Nicholas Phillips at Finance Canada. The
framework looked at the following evaluation
variables:
￿ spillovers;
￿ sensitivity of R&D to tax incentives;
￿ costs of administration and compliance; and
￿ costs of financing the tax incentive.
The conclusion from this analysis is that, based on
reasonable values of the key evaluation variables,
the SR&ED tax credit appears to pass the cost-
benefit test. But there are two important caveats.
First, the results are highly sensitive to the
underlying assumptions; in particular, the estimates
of spillovers from the literature vary widely and
are difficult to quantify. Second, the analysis does
not imply that the current SR&ED incentives are
optimal, or that improvements cannot be made.
In the final section, I will discuss potential tax
policy opportunities that would improve taxation
across the entire innovation value chain, allowing
companies to reap the rewards of their R&D
investments.
Spillovers – The Primary Rationale for R&D
Subsidies
Economists who study public finance have long
argued against targeted tax subsidies on most
types of business inputs.  The reason is that such
subsidies can distort market prices, resulting in a
misallocation of resources and a loss in economic
welfare.
15
14 Based on a survey of 152 executives from the Globe and Mail’s Report on Business Top 1000 Companies, conducted between September 7 and
September 22, 2010.The magazine asked the executives: “Canadian productivity lags behind the US. How important a factor is ________
in explaining weaker Canadian productivity? Is _____ a very important factor, a somewhat important factor, not very important or not at all
important?” The highest percentage (32 percent) of respondents said that “culture of complacency, rather than a drive to innovate” was very
important, ranking ahead of seven other factors (tax incentives, overall taxes, risk aversion, weak R&D culture, inadequate training, regulations,
trade protection). Source: Gandalf Group (2010).
15 This is a well-known result of the Production-Efficiency Theorem by Diamond and Mirrlees (1971).Commentary 334 | 9
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R&D, however, is not a standard input to
production like labour and physical equipment.
The main difference is that it is difficult, if not
impossible, for firms to capture all the benefits
from their R&D efforts, even using modern
mechanisms that protect intellectual property
(e.g., patents, copyright laws). Instead, the benefits
of new knowledge or ideas created spillover to many
firms, not just the performers of R&D.
When private companies cannot capture all of
R&D’s returns, economic theory indicates that
they will invest in it below the level that is socially
desirable. A popular method of correcting this 
so-called “market failure” is through R&D tax
subsidies, compensating firms for the benefit their
R&D investments provide to others. 
The primary rationale for an R&D tax subsidy,
therefore, rests on the idea that one firm’s R&D
creates a positive social benefit, or spillover, for the
entire Canadian economy.
16 While true in theory,
the existence and size of spillovers is an empirical
question, and something researchers have wrestled
with for years. While there are a number of data
and measurement issues that make estimation
difficult,
17 the general conclusion from these
studies is that R&D spillovers are very significant
– that is, that the social return far exceeds the
private return. 
Some of the earlier empirical work by Bernstein
(1988, 1989) generated estimates showing
relatively low domestic spillovers (i.e., the amount
the domestic social return exceeds the private
return) of 9 percent to 16 percent, while more
recent studies have yielded spillovers in excess of
100 percent (e.g. Park 2004). Reviewing the
empirical literature from eight Canadian studies,
Parsons and Phillips (2007) calculated a median
domestic spillover estimate of 56 percent, with
individual estimates ranging widely from 9 percent
to 138 percent. 
Sensitivity of R&D to Tax Incentives
Large spillovers do not of themselves justify R&D
tax incentives. Business R&D must also respond
to these incentives. If tax credits subsidize firms
that would have undertaken R&D in any event,
they are not fulfilling their intended purpose of
stimulating more R&D. 
Isolating the impact of tax credits on business
R&D requires careful statistical analysis that
controls for other influences on R&D spending,
such as changes in output, interest rates, industry
composition, etc. The results of such studies are
clear: R&D tax incentives do appear to stimulate
R&D investment, by reducing the cost of R&D.
Estimates of the incrementality ratio – the amount
of R&D generated per $1 in subsidy – range from
28 cents to $1.38, but most estimates cluster
around 90 cents, with the median Canadian
estimate calculated by Parsons and Phillips (2007)
at 86 cents. 
The Cost of Tax Incentives
Another key consideration when evaluating any
tax incentive is the public cost. The first element is
the direct cost of compliance and administration.
The SR&ED program involves complex, technical
assessments and requires comprehensive
documentation. While information is limited and
somewhat dated, survey information suggests that
the cost of compliance is significant. A survey by
Finance Canada and Revenue Canada (1996)
shows that that the cost of complying with the
credit ranges from 15 cents per dollar of credit
16 Another rationale is capital market failures, caused by asymmetric information between the investor and the R&D performing firm. There is
some evidence that R&D is subject to financing constraints, likely due to capital market problems (Hall and Lerner, 2009). By increasing the
after-tax cash flow to financially constrained firms, tax credits help alleviate possible financing constraints. This effect is, in part, captured in
the empirical estimates on the sensitivity of R&D to the tax incentives.
17 See Jones and Williams (1998) for a discussion of measurement issues surrounding spillovers and the social return to R&D, and the link to
economic growth theory.| 10 Commentary 334
claimed for small claims (less than $100,000) to
six cents per dollar of credit for large claims (more
than $500,000). Weighting these values by actual
credits granted, Parsons and Phillips (2007)
estimate the cost of compliance is about eight
cents per dollar of credit and that the costs of
administering the program is approximately two
cents per dollar of credit.
The second element of the public cost is
indirect, but much more important. Taxes distort
economic behaviour – decisions to save, invest
and work – resulting in a reduction in economic
efficiency and economic output. The marginal
cost of funds (MCF) quantifies the cost associated
with raising one dollar of taxes (or keeping them
higher than otherwise required) to finance public
expenditure or tax subsidies, such as R&D tax
credits.
18 It is calculated as the $1 transfer of
resources from the private to the public sector plus
the marginal excess burden (MEB) or marginal
efficiency loss from taxation.
The size of the efficiency loss, or MEB, from
taxation depends on the tax used to generate
revenue.  Baylor and Beauséjour (2004) use a
Canadian general equilibrium model to quantify
the MEB for different taxes. Financing a tax
subsidy by raising corporate income taxes is
associated with a relatively high MEB of 0.4, or 
40 cents for every dollar raised, due to the
damaging effects of such taxes on investment and
the tax base. Dahlby and Ferede (2011) generate
an even higher MEB of about 0.7, or 70 cents,
associated with the federal government levying a
dollar of corporate income taxes. 
Other taxes impose less harm to the economy.
Baylor and Beauséjour (2004) show that a dollar
raised through a value added sales tax (VAT) is
associated with a relatively low MEB of about 0.1
since a VAT is broadly applied to most goods and
services and helps minimize market distortions. 
To estimate the costs of financing the SR&ED tax
credit, Parsons and Phillips (2007) calculated a
weighted average MEB for the Canadian economy
of 0.27, with weights reflecting federal government
reliance on each type of tax. This means that $1
raised through the tax system to finance the
SR&ED tax credit imposes an efficiency cost on
the economy of about 27 cents.
19
Weighing the Costs and Benefits
An evaluation of the SR&ED program must
account for all the costs and benefits discussed
above. Parsons and Phillips (2007) employ a
simple welfare model of R&D investment that
factors in each of the key evaluation variables –
R&D spillovers, sensitivity of R&D investment to
tax credits, the marginal cost of funds, as well as
compliance and administrative costs. Using mid-
point estimates from the literature discussed
above, they find that the tax credit appears to
generate a net welfare benefit of 11 cents per dollar
of subsidy. In other words, the additional R&D
stimulated by the credit appears to generate a high
enough social return to more than offset the costs.
However, Parsons and Phillips caution that the
results are highly sensitive to the underlying
assumptions.  A spillover return of only 13
percentage points lower than the median estimate
tips the scale to a net welfare loss. In other words,
for the SR&ED to record a net benefit it must
generate spillovers in excess of 43 percent. Given
the wide range of estimates and the difficulty in
measuring these spillovers, it is not difficult to
imagine a scenario where the spillovers could fall
below this level. Similarly, the incrementality ratio
would only need to fall by 0.2 points to yield a
net welfare loss. Overall, based on the authors’
reasonable range of estimates, the bulk of
estimates would support a net benefit from the
program, but with some chance of a welfare loss.
C.D. Howe Institute
18 One can also interpret the MCF as an opportunity cost, namely the benefit that could have instead been realized by lowering other taxes
instead of providing an SR&ED tax credit. For a more comprehensive discussion of the Marginal Cost of Funds see Dahlby (2008) and
Dahlby and Ferede (2011). 
19 This is remarkably close to Dahlby and Ferede’s (2011) estimate of 0.26 (or in MCF terms 1.26) for the federal government. Commentary 334 | 11
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Table 1: How to Raise the Net Benefit of R&D Tax Incentives in Canada
Source: Author based on evaluation framework used by Parsons and Phillips (2007).
Benefits Costs
Increase the amount of R&D generated for 
every dollar of tax incentive.
Decrease the cost of financing the tax 
subsidy – rely on the least distortionary taxes 
to raise revenue.
Increase the spillover benefits associated with
business R&D in Canada
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Figure 5: Welfare Effect of the SR&ED Tax Credit
*Spillover benefits generated in Canada per dollar of R&D. Equals domestic return on R&D in Canada less the private return. 
**Additional R&D per dollar of R&D subsidy.
Source: Parsons and Phillips (2007).| 12 Commentary 334
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From the perspective of a provincial government,
provincial R&D tax credits are less likely to pass the
cost-benefit test, according to Dahlby (2005). The
reason is that a portion of the spillovers is likely 
to cross provincial boundaries, reducing the size 
of the benefit that each province receives on its
R&D subsidies. 
Federal Tax Policy Implications
While the previous section offers evidence that the
SR&ED tax incentive appears to generate a net
benefit for Canada, the analysis does not imply
that the current program is optimal, or that there
is no room for improvement.
20 Moreover, there is
a great deal of uncertainty regarding this net benefit
given the wide range in estimates from the literature,
particularly those relating to spillover benefits.
The implication is that policymakers should
keep a watchful eye on SR&ED and other related
R&D tax incentives to make sure they add value.
For the federal government in particular, proposed
tax changes aimed at fostering R&D should be
focused on improving either the benefit or the
cost side of the cost-benefit equation, as shown 
in Table 1.
On the costs of financing SR&ED tax credits,
some progress has been made to reduce Canada’s
reliance on the most harmful, or distortionary,
taxes. The federal government’s commitment 
to lowering the corporate income tax rate to 
15 percent by 2013 will give Canada the lowest
marginal tax rates on new investments among G7
countries (Department of Finance 2010).
Harmonization of sales taxes in Ontario has also
been positive for Canada’s overall the tax mix,
with the predicted impact of increasing investment
and jobs through its elimination of taxes on
business capital purchases (Smart and Bird 2008;
Mintz 2010), benefits that could have been
realized in BC before the cancellation of its HST.
The benefits of harmonization should help offset
some of the effects of the two-percentage-point-
reduction in the federal Goods and Services Tax
(GST), which increased the federal government’s
reliance on more harmful corporate and personal
income taxes. 
The Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) has also
made some improvements to the SR&ED
application forms over the past decade and
announced administrative improvements in the
2008 federal budget. However, the program is still
widely considered expensive to comply with,
especially for small firms (Wensley 2010).  In
particular, a recent paper by the Canadian
Chamber of Commerce (2011) argues that its
members spend too much time on compliance
activities. Some companies say they are experiencing
a lack of predictability, as claims that were once
approved are now being turned down. 
However, any efforts to lower compliance and
administration costs should be done carefully and
weighed against the possible consequences. The
SR&ED program, like other tax programs,
necessarily involves a great deal of oversight and
documentation to protect against potential abuses.
A recent Globe and Mail article (McKenna 2011)
highlights anecdotal cases of abuse, where improper
or even fraudulent documentation is used to
satisfy SR&ED claims. While a more comprehensive
study is required to better understand potential
program abuses, the key message is that a lack of
enforcement and documentation could lead to the
spread of routine business activities that do not
meet the definition of qualifying expenditures
(described in Box 1) as being incorrectly classified
and reported as SR&ED. Therefore, in the context
of the evaluation framework, the benefit of lower
administration and compliance costs could be
more than offset by a decline in social benefits as
subsidies are channelled to non-R&D activities.
One way to minimize compliance costs without
raising the risk of illegitimate claims is to ensure
tax rules are transparent, simple to understand 
and consistently applied.
20 The analysis is based on average parameters over a period of time and concludes that there has likely been a net welfare benefit from the
program. Determining the optimal SR&ED tax subsidy would require equating the marginal benefits of the program with its marginal costs. Commentary 334 | 13
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Perhaps the greatest opportunity for improvement
is on the benefit side of the equation. Of course,
there are a number of policies unrelated to tax 
that may increase the value of existing R&D tax
incentives, such as potential changes to patent
laws, grant programs, capital market rules,
regulations and competition policy. There are 
also a number of more detailed SR&ED design
considerations that may be improved. However,
the next section is focused specifically on some
broader tax policy options.
So what should be done? Canadian tax policy
should be focused on creating a competitive tax
environment across the entire innovation value
chain, from initial R&D through commercialization
to the development and production of new
products and services in Canada. In the following
section, I will show that the current system of tax
support is front-end loaded, pushing firms to
undertake R&D though upfront subsidies.
Meanwhile, the rewards from R&D and other
innovative activities are taxed, often at rates above
many of Canada’s international competitors,
creating a disincentive to commercialize, develop
and produce new products and services in
Canada. This likely has a negative impact on the
level of R&D and the amount of spillover benefits
accruing to Canada. The following tax policy
options are aimed at generating more value from
Canada’s existing incentives through a more
balanced approach to R&D tax policy.
Addressing Market “Pull” Factors 
As noted, the SR&ED provides one of the world’s
most generous upfront incentives to undertake
R&D in Canada. However, once investments in
R&D lead to commercial success in the form of
new products, services and processes, the income
is taxed like any other form of investment. 
Recent evidence suggests that it is more likely
that firms will undertake R&D in Canada if the
returns, or fruits of R&D efforts, are taxed at a
low rate. McKenzie and Sershun (2010) show that
R&D investment is responsive to not only “push”
tax factors (upfront subsidies such as the SR&ED
tax credit) but also “pull” factors (the rate at which
future production from R&D is taxed). Examining
data in nine countries over a period of 19 years,
they find that the pull effect of the production tax
system is highly important and of similar magnitude
to the push effect: a 10 percent decrease in the
effective tax rate on marginal production costs
leads to a 6 percent to 8 percent increase in R&D
intensity (R&D to output) in the long run. 
This finding should not be surprising. Innovative
activity tends to cluster geographically, with R&D
often linked with product development and
production activities. A widely cited study by
Audretsch and Feldman (1996) shows that in
industries where industry R&D, university research
and skilled labour are most important, there is a
greater propensity for activity to cluster in a
particular region than in other less knowledge-
based industries. Reviewing the literature,
Feldman (2000) notes that production is most
geographically concentrated in industries where
new knowledge is most important. This suggests
that there may be limits to the extent R&D and
subsequent production activities can be separated.
In other words, R&D and production are, to
some extent, complementary. The linkages of
innovation activity – from R&D to subsequent
production – within regions or countries may help
explain why pull tax factors are empirically
important drivers of R&D activity. 
Also supporting the need to improve the “pull”
forces of innovation is the link between R&D
activity and investment in physical machinery and
equipment (M&E). Firms that undertake R&D
tend to be high growth and capital intensive. They
are focused on developing new products and
processes that use less labour (Harris 2005).
Moreover, firms that undertake R&D may be
more focused on adopting new technologies
through the acquisition of M&E. 
Analyzing investment data in Canada’s
manufacturing sector, Sourare (2009) found that
M&E and R&D investments are positively linked
in the long run, and the direction of causality runs
in both directions – a finding supported by| 14 Commentary 334
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previous studies.
21 The link between business
investment in M&E and R&D suggests that tax
policies should not be narrowly focused on
providing upfront subsidies for R&D, but should
also foster greater business investment. 
Overall, these studies suggest that Canada needs
to consider not only upfront subsidies like the
SR&ED tax credit, but also the competitiveness
of the overall corporate tax system. As McKenzie
(2006) notes: 
“Failing to take account of both effects might
result in government’s giving with one hand and
taking away with the other:  encouraging R&D by
offering direct subsidies...but discouraging R&D
by imposing high production taxes on the new
products and processes that are the fruits of R&D.” 
The good news is that there have been strides in
the right direction to improve the competitiveness
of Canada’s corporate tax system, increasing the
incentives to undertake R&D. The combined
federal and provincial corporate income tax rate
has dropped from 43 percent in 2000 to 29 percent
in 2010 and is set to fall further to about 25 percent
by 2012. These reductions, combined with sales
tax harmonization efforts, will cause the marginal
effective tax rate on new investment (METR) in
Canada to fall from 28 percent in 2009 to about
18 percent in 2013 (Chen and Mintz, 2011).
22
However, even with these changes, Chen and
Mintz (2011) estimate that Canada will lag
slightly behind the OECD average for business
tax competitiveness in 2013, as other countries
implement their planned or proposed corporate
tax cuts. An ongoing concern is that the tax
system continues to create an unlevel playing
field, with companies in the service sector facing a
tax disadvantage relative to manufacturers. Indeed,
Chen and Mintz note that the gap between
Canada’s METR ranking in services relative to
manufacturing is the largest of all OECD countries.
The gap mainly arises from investment tax credits
and other targeted incentives that primarily
benefit manufacturers.
There may be other tax options for encouraging
additional R&D through “pull” factors. Part of
the solution may lie in re-examining how income
on Canadian intellectual property (IP) is taxed in
an international context. Under current tax rules,
royalty and licensing income derived by Canadian
companies from IP developed in Canada or
developed or acquired by Canadian foreign affiliates
and repatriated to Canada are subject to full
Canadian tax. According to Mustard, Pantaleo and
Wilkie (2009), the current tax system encourages
companies to transfer IP outside of Canada, where
licensing and royalty income is often taxed at
lower rates. They also argue that the current system
discourages Canadian companies with foreign
operations from repatriating IP to Canada. 
This argument is supported by the findings of
Finance Minister Jim Flaherty’s Advisory Panel on
Canada’s System of International Taxation. In its
consultations, the panel noted that Canadian
businesses often choose to move IP outside of
Canada.
23 To increase commercialization of R&D
in Canada, the panel suggested that the federal
government monitor developments in other
countries and consider the option of exempting
IP-related income from Canadian tax, or taxing it
at a preferential rate.
24
Other countries have, or are considering, moving
to a system where IP income is taxable at a
significantly lower rate than regular business
income, a tax arrangement known as a “patent
box.” The UK, for example, recently announced
that profits attributed to patents after April 2013
will be taxed at a rate of only 10 percent, well
below its 26 percent general corporate income tax
21 Evidence is also presented in Harris (2005).
22 These METR estimates were prepared in February 2011 assuming the HST in BC would proceed. Therefore, they somewhat overstate
Canada’s international corporate tax competitiveness in 2013. The METR is a summary measure of the competitiveness of a jurisdiction’s
corporate tax system. It includes all taxes that impact a businesses incentive to invest in a new project, including corporate income taxes,
depreciation allowances, interest deductibility and provincial retail sales taxes.
23 Advisory Panel on Canada’s System of International Taxation, p. 86, paragraph 7.31 (2008).
24 Advisory Panel on Canada’s System of International Taxation, p. 98, paragraph 8.15 to 8.16 (2008).Commentary 334 | 15
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rate.
25 According to the UK’s HM Treasury and
HM Revenue and Customs (2011):
“The aim (of the patent box) is to provide an
additional incentive for companies in the UK to
retain and commercialise existing patents and to
develop new innovative patented products. This
will encourage companies to locate the high-value
jobs associated with the development, manufacture
and exploitation of patents in the UK and
maintain the UK’s position as a world leader in
patented technologies.” 
Similar patent boxes were introduced in the
Netherlands and Belgium as of 2007, and in
Luxemburg and Spain in 2008. In the US, while
no patent box exists, MNEs can often shelter
foreign-source royalty and patent income earned
by their subsidiaries by applying excess foreign tax
credits from other income.
26 Moreover, many
countries have generous tax depreciation
deductions for newly acquired IP that are not
available in Canada.
In principle, taxes on highly mobile forms of
income should be kept relatively low (Mirrlees et.
al. 2011). Patent related income is very mobile – it
can easily be transferred from location to location.
However, as patent boxes are relatively new,
empirical evidence on their effectiveness remains
sparse. In one of the few studies, Griffith, Miller
and O’Connell (2010) of the London-based
Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) have simulated
the impacts of patent boxes, using previously
estimated models of firm behaviour. They found
that a country introducing a patent box can expect
to attract more patents and patent income. At the
same time, they found the rise in patent income is
not enough to offset the lower tax rate, resulting
in a decline in tax revenue from patent income. 
The IFS study raises important questions about
the direct tax revenue impacts of a patent box
policy. But it does not provide evidence as to
whether patent boxes result in a rise in R&D and
commercialization activity – and the associated
increase in tax revenues that may result. While
R&D and patent activities can be separated, all
else equal, a firm would likely prefer to license the
technology in the same jurisdiction where the idea
was developed in order to avoid the costs and
administrative burden associated with establishing
separate licensing companies or branches in other
countries. In the UK, retaining IP is one of the
motivations behind the proposed patent box. The
HM Treasury and HM Revenue and Customs (2011)
report claims that “The Patent Box will encourage
investment and development of new patents and
prevent movement of IP offshore by innovative
business who otherwise might invest elsewhere.”
There is also the possibility that patent boxes
may increase the size of domestic spillover benefits
from related R&D to the extent that IP is shared
and further developed within the patent box
country instead of abroad. While this possibility
requires further analysis, a widely cited study by
Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson (1993) shows
that there is indeed a local bias to patent citation
activity in the US: patents are most likely to be
cited (or used) in the same state, and in particular,
the same metropolitan area, as where the patent
was generated. 
Overall, much still needs to be learned about
patent boxes and their effect on innovation
performance. One of the main challenges is the
patent box’s design, especially determining what
types of patents and related income should be
eligible for inclusion. Such eligibility requirements
come with their own set of administrative and
compliance issues.
27
Still, Canadian governments should watch closely
as other countries change the way in which they
25 The patent box deduction will be available to businesses that actively hold a qualifying patent or other qualifying IP and receive income
related to that patent or IP. Eligible patents are proposed to include patents granted by UK’s Intellectual Property Office and the European
Patent Office.
26 US MNEs earn foreign tax credits for taxes paid on income earned by their foreign subsidiaries. FTCs reduce and often eliminate US taxes
payable on foreign income that is repatriated to the US.
27 For example, as discussed by Griffith and Miller (2010), it may be easy to identify income from technology that a company licenses out, but
it is more challenging to identify income from patented technology that a firm uses to generate income. Challenges may also arise if income
is coming from a variety of patents, but where only some are eligible for the patent box.| 16 Commentary 334
promote R&D and commercialization activity
through greater use of “pull” drivers as opposed to
the more traditional reliance on R&D tax subsidies.
Just as competition has driven down corporate
income tax rates, it is also leading to competition
in the IP area. While reductions in Canada’s
corporate tax rate have made the tax treatment of
IP income more competitive, it is unclear whether
the lower rate will be sufficient to prevent IP from
being transferred out of Canada and developed in
countries that are now aggressively pursuing
patent boxes. 
As suggested by the Advisory Panel on Canada’s
System of International Taxation, the federal
government should monitor developments in
other countries and study whether there may be
opportunities to improve the tax treatment of IP
income, with the goal of improving Canada’s
record at commercializing the results of R&D
performed in Canada, as well as encouraging the
acquisition of  IP from outside Canada for further
development and licensing.
28
Encouraging Small Innovative Firms to
Grow and Expand
The tax system should not discourage small
Canadian start-ups or firms in early phases of
technology development from growing into larger,
globally competitive companies. As previously
noted, small companies receive strong preferential
tax treatment for R&D investment in Canada. In
particular, current tax rules provide small CCPCs
with an enhanced SR&ED credit of 35 percent
for spending up to $3 million. This amount is
fully refundable on current expenditures and 
40 percent refundable on capital expenditures
regardless of whether there is any taxable income.
In contrast, medium to large companies receive a
much-reduced 20 percent credit that is non-
refundable.
29
Such favourable tax treatment for small businesses
is not limited to the SR&ED tax incentive. As of
2011, corporate income from CCPCs earning
$500,000 or less is taxed at a federal rate of 11 percent
compared to 16.5 percent for large firms. Moreover,
there are a number of special tax measures,
including the treatment of dividend income and
lifetime capital gains, that favour small over large
business (Chen and Mintz 2011). 
This asymmetric tax treatment creates a large
gap in the subsidy rate received by small and large
firms on R&D investments (Figure 6). Indeed, in
an international context, Canada offers the most
preferential treatment to small firms: the difference
between the small and large-firm R&D subsidy
rate is higher in Canada than any other OECD
country (Finance Canada 2009).
30
The main argument for more favourable R&D
tax support towards small business is that it
compensates for their lack of access to financing.
There are good reasons why small firms may find
it especially difficult to finance R&D investments,
including the lack of collateral in many technology
start-ups, asymmetric information between
financers and the firm (e.g., due to the technical
nature of R&D and fears ideas will be leaked to
competitors), and the uncertainty of future
returns. The theoretical literature is inconclusive
on whether information asymmetries lead to over
or under investment.
31 However, the empirical
C.D. Howe Institute
28 Further study should include any administrative issues and potential abuses that may arise from such a policy.
29 In contrast, most provinces with provincial R&D tax incentives do not discriminate between large and small firms, both in terms of the
provincial credit rate and refundability. However, some provinces (e.g., Alberta) impose a R&D expenditure limit.
30 In addition to Canada, only five other OECD countries (out of 30) provide an enhanced federal R&D tax credit for small firms.
31 The theoretical literature does not always reach the conclusion that asymmetric information leads to underinvestment. Boadway and Keen
(2006), for example, use a model of adverse selection to show that asymmetric information can lead to bad (or “lemons”) projects being
financed, resulting in overinvestment. However, this finding is based on the strong assumption that entrepreneurs are risk neutral, which is
likely not the case if entrepreneurs are investing their own wealth in the project. Braido, da Costa and Dahlby (2011) extend the Boadway
and Keen (2006) model to allow for risk aversion by entrepreneurs, and they find that the market may finance too many, too few, or the
wrong kind of start-ups depending on the degree of risk aversion and other model parameters. In short, the theoretical models suggest that
government should be cautious in how it attempts to address perceived capital market imperfections caused by asymmetric information.Commentary 334 | 17
evidence suggests that small firms, particularly
those in their early stages, face the greatest
constraints to financing R&D due to imperfections
in capital markets (Hall 2002, Hall and Lerner
2009). A more generous, refundable tax credit is
intended to alleviate capital market problems
faced by small firms, giving them financial
resources to undertake R&D while in the pre-
profit stage of development. Others argue that
more favourable tax treatment is required to
address the higher compliance and administration
burden that small businesses face on SR&ED claims
as described previously.
However, some commentators have voiced
concerns over the extent of Canada’s asymmetric
tax treatment towards R&D. Wensley and Warda
(2007) and Wensley (2010), for example, argue
that the current tax rules significantly limit 
the benefits larger firms outside the CCPC
definition, namely US multinationals, receive 
from SR&ED credits. 
There is also the question of how well the
enhanced subsidy targets the firms most in need
of support. The size of a business may not be
always be associated with capital market problems.
For example, the age of the company, namely
whether it is a start-up or a mature firm, may
indicate more about its problems raising capital
than its size. Examining the evidence, a paper by
International Monetary Fund staff argues that
“best response to market failures that may
adversely affect SME (small and medium sized
enterprises) is unlikely to be through size-related
tax measures.”
32 The IMF paper highlights the
challenges of using tax policy to address problems
faced by a target group of small firms, arguing that
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Figure 6: Canada’s Asymmetric R&D Tax Treatment Between Small and Large Firms
* Percentage reduction in cost of R&D due to tax incentives.
** Unweighted average of R&D subsidy rates from 30 OECD countries and 6 emerging and transition economies. 
Source: Finance Canada (2009).
32 Background paper prepared by IMF staff with input from participants from other organizations participating in the International Tax
Dialogue Conference 2007 (OECD, World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank). See International Tax Dialogue (2007).33 The authors acknowledge that more research is required to determine the impact of tax differences. Chen, Lee and Mintz (2002) suggest that
differences in tax codes provide small businesses with an incentive to keep income below certain thresholds to take advantage of preferential
rates in Canada.
34 Chen and Mintz (2011b), however, note that many provinces have moved in the opposite direction, with the small business tax rate being
cut more aggressively than the general corporate tax rate. Manitoba, for example, has announced that it will eliminate its provincial tax rate
for small business entirely by 2012. 
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that such a system can create additional distortions
(i.e., incentives to stay small or split up companies
for tax purposes), and increase administrative and
compliance costs.
Most importantly, the preferential treatment of
small firms may have the unintended consequence
of encouraging young, innovative firms to stay
small and not grow into larger companies. As a firm
grows, it may lose its favoured status as a small
CCPC and face a significant increase in its tax
burden. Indeed, simply moving from a qualifying
small CCPC to a public or foreign-controlled
company results in an immediate reduction in the
eligible SR&ED credit rate from 35 percent
mainly refundable to 20 percent non-refundable. 
But even as a firm achieves initial R&D success
and grows, the innovation process does not stop.
It will likely need to undertake additional R&D
to remain competitive, by continuously
introducing new and improved products, services
and processes. In fact, nearly three-quarters of
Canadian business R&D is performed by firms
with more than $50 million in revenues (STIC
2011). Subsequent rounds of R&D performed by a
medium to large firm may produce similar
knowledge spillover benefits as its R&D at the
start-up stage, but carries much lower levels of 
tax support. 
A recent study by Chen and Mintz (2011b)
finds that Canada’s tax system, through the claw
back of tax incentives (including R&D tax
credits), creates a “taxation wall” for small business
that inhibits growth. In particular, they show that
marginal effective tax rates on capital investments
made by a Canadian entrepreneur rise sharply as
the business grows. As an example, the effective
tax rate roughly doubles when the business grows
from $1 million in assets to more than $30
million. Based on these results, Chen and Mintz
argue that Canada adopt more neutral tax policies
to promote small business growth. Their findings
follow a similar concern raised by the OECD
(2008): “small Canadian owned firms are also
unduly advantaged, which may discourage them
from growing and becoming more productive.” 
More empirical evidence is required to examine
the extent to which Canada’s tax system impedes
growth of small businesses. Leung, Meh and
Terajima (2008) show that Canadian firms tend to
be on average much smaller than US ones, and
that the average size of Canadian firms has been
falling over time. Moreover, they show that the
predominance of small firms helps explain why
Canada’s productivity lags behind that of the US.
Of course, as the authors argue, differences in tax
codes represent only one of many possible
explanations as to why Canadian firms are smaller.
33
Other factors that may help explain firm size
distribution across countries include differences in
small firm financing conditions, the protection of
property for entrepreneurs, and the size of the market.
To help remove growth disincentives, the federal
government should consider options to reduce the
asymmetric treatment of small and large firm
R&D and other related investments. In this respect,
the planned reduction of the general federal
corporate income tax rate to 15 percent by 2013 
is a positive development, as it helps reduce the
disparity between large and small firms in terms of
how the profits stemming from R&D activities
are taxed.
34
But there are a number of other options the
federal government could consider. The current
system reduces the R&D expenditure limit
eligible for the refundable 35 percent tax credit
based on established thresholds for prior-year
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taxable income and capital. Thresholds for which
the 35 percent rate applies have increased in recent
years, but they still strongly favour small business,
with the credit rate quickly falling to 20 percent
after relatively small increases in income or capital.
For example, a small CCPC would be eligible for
a 35 percent refundable tax credit on the first $3
million of R&D spending if it had prior-year
taxable income under $500,000 and taxable
capital under $10 million. If the small CCPC
instead had prior-year taxable income of $800,000
(but with the same amount of capital), it would be
eligible only for a 20 percent non-refundable
credit rate on all amounts of R&D spending. 
In this hypothetical example, the financing
constraints (if any) faced by the firm in the two
scenarios are, in all likelihood, fundamentally the
same, but the tax subsidy is dramatically different.
These large swings in tax support could be
reduced by closing the small-large SR&ED
subsidy rate gap by having a more graduated or
phased reduction in the tax credit as firms grow
and expand, or a combination of both. The new
system would need to be carefully designed so that
it does not significantly increase the fiscal cost of
the already generous SR&ED program or raise the
tax system’s complexity. 
Conclusions
A commonly voiced concern is that Canadian
businesses spend relatively little on R&D despite
having access to some of the world’s most
generous R&D tax incentives. This observation
has called into question the effectiveness of
Canada’s generous R&D tax incentives, particularly
the flagship federal Scientific Research and
Experimental Development (SR&ED) program.
In this Commentary, I have shown that the SR&ED
program appears to generate a narrow net benefit
for Canada, based on reasonable estimates of key
evaluation variables – the sensitivity of R&D to
tax incentives, knowledge spillovers from R&D,
compliance and administrative costs, and costs of
financing the incentives.
But this finding should be interpreted with
caution. First, there is a great deal of uncertainty
regarding the net benefit given the wide range in
estimates from the literature, particularly those
relating to spillovers. Second, the mere observation
of a net benefit does not imply that the current
SR&ED incentives are optimal, or that improvements
cannot be made. If anything, the sensitivity of the
results to underlying assumptions indicate that the
SR&ED program is highly susceptible to falling
into the “net loss” category in the absence of change.
In this Commentary, I have explored options for
generating more value from Canada’s federal tax
policies toward R&D, using the SR&ED evaluation
framework as a guide. The main conclusion,
supported by other studies, is that Canada would
likely benefit from a more balanced approached,
focused on creating a competitive tax environment
across the entire innovation value chain, from
initial R&D through commercialization to the
development and production of new products and
services. The current system of tax support is
front-end loaded, pushing firms to undertake
R&D through one of the world’s most generous
tax subsidies. At the same time, the rewards to
R&D and other innovative activities are taxed, at
a rate that still exceeds most OECD countries,
creating a disincentive to commercialize and
develop new products and services in Canada.
This likely has a negative impact on the level
R&D investment and the amount of spillover
benefits accruing to Canada. 
This analysis has some federal tax policy
implications. Most importantly, the tax system must
not discourage firms from turning R&D into
commercially viable ideas and technologies as well
as new products and services produced in Canada.
This requires that Canadian taxes on the fruits of
R&D – the returns on IP and new and improved
products and services – are at internationally
competitive levels. Past and planned corporate tax
reductions are an important step in the right
direction. But even with these tax cuts, research
shows that Canada’s overall business tax
competitiveness will still lag behind the OECD
average and that the tax system remains biased
against the service sector. 
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Moreover, in recent years there has been a trend
in Europe toward lowering the tax on income
derived from intellectual property such as patents.
As suggested by the Advisory Panel on Canada’s
System of International Taxation, the federal
government should monitor these developments
and study whether there may be opportunities to
improve the tax treatment of IP income. 
Another implication is that the tax system
should not discourage small firms to grow from
the start-up or early phases of technology
development into larger, globally competitive
companies. The current tax system creates a
disincentive for growth through its strong
preferential treatment of small business R&D.
Indeed, Canada has the largest gap between small
and large firm R&D tax subsidy rates of all
OECD countries. Moving to a more neutral
system that reduces the large swings in tax support
between small and large firm R&D tax treatment
would reduce this growth disincentive.
Overall, it seems that the federal government’s
best bet is to concentrate efforts on creating a
competitive tax system across the entire innovation
value chain. Innovation is a multi-stage, integrated
process that encompasses more than R&D. It often
starts with the discovery of new knowledge, spreads
to the commercialization and adoption of ideas
and progresses toward the development of new
and improved products, services and processes.
Each stage of the innovation chain is important,
and this should be reflected in Canada’s tax system. 
In recent years, Canada has been moving in the
right direction with general corporate tax reductions,
helping create market pull drivers and reducing
the disincentive for growth. But Canada cannot
sit still, as other countries look to attract R&D
activity and the skilled labour it brings.  A tax
system that allows firms to reap more of the
rewards of their innovative activity is likely to
improve Canada’s overall innovation performance
and economic competitiveness.
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